

prescription (1131a20-4), a distribution of things that are ἴσα is fair, only if it is fitting to regard the parties as ἴσοι. So again the conclusion is that in exchange the parties are equal.

IV

Clarifying Aristotle's theory of fair exchange is worthwhile for its own sake, and for another reason too. The substantial analysis in chapter 5 is not devoted to fairness itself, but to explaining the logical possibility of a condition upon which Aristotle believes it to rest, *viz.*, the equation 'x shoes = 1 house'. All things (πάντα) can and do stand in these equations, but it is difficult to see how they can when they are so different by nature that they seem not to be commensurable (σύμμετρα). Aristotle's analysis of this problem is one of his great achievements.¹⁶ It is the first conceptual enquiry into the nature of exchange-value, and in the days when classical education was commoner than it is now its importance was appreciated by economists. Marx's analysis of exchange-value is explicitly based on it, and Böhm-Bawerk, the economist of the Austrian School and Marx's earliest serious critic, scorned the fact that 'Marx had found in old Aristotle the idea that "exchange cannot exist without equality, and equality cannot exist without commensurability"'.¹⁷ Yet, Aristotle's discussion of these matters has gone largely unnoticed in the classical and philosophical literature on chapter 5, particularly in the anglophone world. The reasons for this can only be guessed at, but it is perhaps not unduly credulous to suppose that among them has been the belief that an inexplicable inequality between builder and shoemaker lies at the centre of the chapter.

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¹⁶ The discussion is analysed in my 'Aristotle and the political economy of the polis', *JHS* xcix (1979) 57-73, substantially revised in D. Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr., eds., *A companion to Aristotle's Politics* (Oxford 1991) 156-81, reprinted in Mark Blaug, ed., *Aristotle* (London 1991) 195-220.

¹⁷ E. von Böhm-Bawerk, *Karl Marx and the close of his system*, ed. Paul M. Sweezy (London 1975) 68.

The Greek ships at Salamis and the *Dieklous*

In his notice in *JHS* cviii (1988) 250 of *The Athenian trireme (AT)* by Dr J. F. Coates and myself J. F. Lazenby makes two criticisms.

1 *The Greek ships at Salamis*

L. claims that the reconstruction of the trieres proposed in *AT*, being based on late 5th century and 4th century evidence, is misleading for the earlier ships, and that the Greek ships of 480, unlike the later ones, were not built for speed and manoeuvrability, and carried more than ten hoplites. He goes on to say that the Greeks won at Salamis

'because their ships stood up to ramming better' than those of their opponents. For this last view he cites no text in evidence, and as far as I know there is none. There is the statement in Herodotus (viii 60a) that the Greek ships were heavier; but L. attributes this greater heaviness not to thicker planking but to the greater number of armed men they carried, which would entail a broader hull and bulwarks but not thicker planking. Admittedly, if they were not built for speed and manoeuvrability, like the later ships, they *could* have had thicker planking but there is no evidence that they did. There is however some evidence that they were built, and manned, for lightness and speed.

L. argues that they carried more than ten hoplites on board on two grounds. In the first place there were the 40 hoplites carried by the Chian ships at Lade in 499 and the thirty armed men (in addition to the normal 10) carried by the ships of the Persian fleet in 480 (for the probable reason see *AT* 41). Forty is the regular number of hoplites carried by trieres acting as troop carriers (*hoplitagōgoi*, *stratiôtides*) in the later fifth century; yet L. is presumably arguing that the Greek ships in 480, to be appreciably heavier than the Persian (with 40), must have had a good many (10-20) more. I do not find this likely, and it is certainly unrecorded. It is plain from Plutarch (*Cimon* 12.2) supported by Thucydides (i 14.3) that Themistocles's trieres, 'built for speed and manoeuvrability' with narrow decks (and hence few hoplites on them), are to be contrasted with later troop carriers with wider decks (and hence more hoplites). This manning is further supported by the Troezen decree which assigns ten hoplites and four archers to each ship in the Salamis campaign.

L.'s further reason for heavier manning is no more convincing. He asks: 'if there were only 1,800 hoplites "on the Athenian ships" at Artemisium, why were there none at Thermopylae?' and leaves us to conclude presumably that there must have been 180 x 50 = 9000 to 180 x 60 = 10,800 Athenian deck soldiers on the Athenian ships at Artemisium. But Herodotus says (vii 144.3) that (in Sept. 481) 'the Athenians decided to meet the barbarian with their ships *pandēmei*', i.e. putting on board all their able bodied citizens 'and inviting other Greeks who were willing to join them'. Similarly Thucydides (i 18.2) (*cf.* Plutarch *Themistocles* 7.1): 'the Athenians, when the Persians came, . . . went on board their ships and became seamen'. These texts, taken together with the story in Plutarch *Cimon* 4.2 of the young Cimon and his fellow knights dedicating their bridles on the Acropolis before going on board the ships, make it clear that knights, hoplites, and everyone else went on board to do whatever tasks were allotted to them if the 180 ships were to be manned with the 36,000 men needed. Not all the hoplites were employed as deck soldiers, but all were needed on board the ships and there were none to send to Thermopylae. Herodotus's figure for the citizen population of Athens at the beginning of the century is 30,000 (vi 97.4). Arguments based on population numbers are usually fragile, but since Athens had to use her allies to man twenty ships, it seems that her manpower

resources were stretched to the limit to man 180 of them.

There are sufficient good reasons, apart from L.'s hypothesis of heavy manning, to account for the fact attested by Herodotus that the Greek ships were regarded by the Persians before Artemisium as slower than their opponents' (viii 9) and by Themistocles himself before Salamis as heavier (viii 60a), which comes to the same thing. Although the Corinthians (Thuc. i 13.2) 'are said first to have developed a modern navy, and Corinth to have been the first place in Greece where triereis were built' (c.650: *AT* 40), in the following century and a half she is not notable as a naval power; and she sent no ships to the support of the Ionian revolt in 499. Herodotus (v 99.1) says that the Athenians 'sent twenty ships taking with them five triereis from Eretria', words which suggest that the Athenian ships were not triereis. Compared then with the Phoenicians, Egyptians, Cypriots and Asiatic Greeks, all skilled and experienced in the operation of the trieres, the Athenians who provided more than half the Greek ships (200) certainly, and probably at that time the Corinthians also, who provided forty of the further 124, lacked the skill in design and building as well as the experience in rowing the highly sophisticated trieres. Though built for lightness and speed the Greek ships were nevertheless the slower.

There is a further factor which would contribute to the Greek ships' heaviness. It is the 'maintenance factor' dealt with at length in *AT* 153-4. Ships apparently had to be hauled right out of water and 'dried out' at regular and quite frequent intervals (Thuc. vi 44.3, vii 12.3; Arrian, *Indica* 23.5, 25.1, 33.9, 38.9). Herodotus (vii 59.2) reports the 'drying out' of the Persian ships at Doriscus at the mouth of the Hebrus at the outset of their voyage to Greece and a few weeks before the crucial naval battles. The decree which the Troezen inscription represents was passed in September 481 (N. G. L. Hammond, *JHS* cii [1982] 75-93). The ships are likely to have been launched in a matter of days since the evacuation was to take place immediately, and the manning and training of the fleet for active service would have been put in hand; and when that was completed 100 ships were to go to Artemisium, while 100 remained off Attica 'to defend the land' either against a possible attack, as Hammond suggests, from Aegina, with whom Athens until the formation of the Greek League was still at war, or against a possible Persian strike at Attica as had happened in 490. At any rate, from that moment until the sea-battles in the late summer the Greeks would have had no time to put, and could hardly have risked putting, part of their already heavily outnumbered fleet out of action for maintenance. If they in fact did, it is surprising that Herodotus did not mention it, since he did mention, and therefore thought important, the drying out of the Persian fleet at Doriscus. If no maintenance was carried out on the Greek ships for nearly a year, that certainly would have been one of the reasons for their slowness and heaviness compared with the recently 'dried out' Persian ships.

II *The Diekplous*

The second point which requires comment is L.'s opinion that my interpretation of *diekplous* is 'eccentric'. His interpretation of the word is set out in *G&R* xxxiv (1987) 169-77. He identifies *diekplous* as the manoeuvre in ancient naval battles in which the opposing fleets having each adopted a line-abreast (*metôpêdon*) formation advance towards each other and penetrate each other's line, each ship seeking to pass between two enemy ships and to turn and ram (a manoeuvre which if successfully performed would result in a return to the starting position except that the fleets would be facing the opposite way).

The word *diekplous* occurs as the name for the narrow openings through Xerxes' bridge at the Hellespont which rested on pentecontors and triereis drawn up in line abreast (Hdt. vii 36.2). Its use in this passage is at least indicative of, and probably derived from, its regular, and indeed first, occurrence as the name of a naval manoeuvre. Herodotus (vi 12.1) describes the training sessions of Dionysius of Phocaea with the Ionian fleet at the time of the Ionian revolt: 'He regularly took the ships to sea in line ahead (or in column: *epi keras*) with the intention of training the oarsmen in making a *diekplous* with the ships through each other's lines'.

The phrase *epi keras* (see below) indicates the movement of a group of ships in line ahead from a starting formation of line abreast. The usage of the word *diekplous* for passages through Xerxes' bridge of ships suggests that Dionysius's manoeuvre was to take a squadron of ships in line ahead through one in line abreast. Indeed the manoeuvre could hardly be anything else since one squadron must be in line ahead, and for both to be in line ahead would not make sense. Herodotus continues: 'And he turned out the deck soldiers (*epibatai*) in full kit'. The addition indicates that the manoeuvre risked close encounter with the enemy.

The next mention of the *diekplous* is in Herodotus's account of the preliminary skirmish at Artemisium in the Salamis campaign (viii 9): '... since no one put out against them, they waited for late evening and launched ships against the barbarians with the intention of trying them out in fighting at sea and the *diekplous*' (a hendiadys). A preliminary stage in which the two squadrons face each other in line abreast may have been effected but there is no mention of it; and since the following engagement does not appear to be a full-scale battle, it may have been omitted, as it sometimes was even in full-scale battles, e.g. Phormio's first engagement in the Gulf and Arginusae (*AT* 68, 87). He merely says that the Persian ships began to encircle the Greek ships, which formed a circle and breaking out captured thirty ships of the enemy. There was then no Persian *diekplous* but a *periplous* in column.

The phrase *epi keras*, meaning 'to the wing', in naval contexts is to be translated 'in line ahead' or 'in column'. It implies awareness of the customary initial battle formation of ships, in Greek *metôpêdon*, in Latin *in frontem redactae*, that is to say

'facing the front' in line abreast. To move from this formation, like soldiers on a parade ground, ships turn to the right or left wing and move off in column of one to four files according to the depth of the formation in line abreast. The word 'wing' continues to be used in describing the vanguard of a column, e.g. in the expressions 'the right, or left, wing leading'. This terminology may be used of a whole fleet, more often of separate squadrons.

In line abreast the depth of the front is expressed by the preposition *epi* with a numeral in the genitive case, e.g. *epi mias*, *epi tessarôn*, 'one deep', 'four deep'; and the same phrase is used to indicate the number of files in the column because, as in the continued use of the word 'wing', the ships (or men) are still thought of in terms of the basic, and sometimes original, formation *metôpêdon*, although sometimes the ships (or men) have not started in line abreast, column being the normal formation of ships in transit.

A good example of these usages is given in Thucydides' description of the opening phase of Phormio's second battle in the Gulf of Corinth (see *AT* 72-76) where the phrase *epi tessarôn* must necessarily be translated 'in four files' since the fleet is proceeding in column. Understanding of the use of the terminology, *metôpêdon*, *epi keras* or *kerôs*, *epi* + numeral in the genitive case, is essential for the understanding of ancient actions at sea, in particular the battles of Arginusae and Salamis.

Arginusae (AT 87-92)

Xenophon's account (*HG* i 6.29ff) is both detailed and convincing and will be followed, while Diodorus's, which is neither, may be neglected.

The Spartan commander, Callicratidas, with 120 ships moved at daybreak from the coast of Lesbos south of Mytilene (in the region of the modern airport) for about an hour and a half's pulling across the 8 nautical miles (14.7 km) of water to the Arginusae islands where on the previous night he had seen the Athenian camp fires. The Athenian fleet consisted of a hurriedly mobilised force of about 150 ships with scratch crews, including slaves who had been promised their freedom if they served.

When Callicratidas's fleet was seen approaching, the Athenian commanders ordered their ships to sea, adopting, conscious of the inexperience of their crews, an elaborate formation of defense in depth clearly departing from the simple *metôpêdon* formation of ranks abreast. There were four squadrons of fifteen ships each on either wing, two in front and two in support behind, and in the centre two squadrons of ten ships each, drawn up *epi mias* with the three ships of the nauarchs and a few others behind them. It has been noticed above that *epi mias* in itself is ambiguous, meaning either 'one deep' or 'in single file' according to the context.

Only the two centre squadrons of ten ships each are said to be *epi mias*, the eight wing squadrons not being so labelled. The reason for distinguishing the centre squadrons as *epi mias* is presumably because the regular formation of a fifteen ship squadron was taken for granted (i.e. 3 x 5), whereas the

formation of a squadron of ten (common later: Polybius xxii 7.4 and Diodorus xiv 103) was not generally *epi mias* but rather 2 x 5. If ten ship squadrons were not normally *epi mias*, it is likely that fifteen ship squadrons were not so either. Later (the squadrons of) the Spartan fleet are distinguished as *epi mias*.

If *epi mias* here means 'one deep', the tactical plan of the Athenian fleet is highly unbalanced. A 'one deep' line of twenty ships at the centre in front of the important command post (the 'ships of the nauarchs') is a positive invitation for *diekplous* on any interpretation of the word, and contradicts Xenophon's explicit statement that the Athenian tactical plan was devised 'so that they should not give an opportunity for *diekplous*'. It should be noticed incidentally that the *diekplous* was regarded as a movement which could be thwarted by tactical disposition, not merely by good management of single ships. This would hardly be the case if it was the movement of a single line of ships *metôpêdon* attempting to penetrate individually a line of enemy ships also *metôpêdon*.

Xenophon now turns to the Spartan ships which he had left beginning their one-and-a-half hour's row across 8 nm of water. An average speed of five and one-third knots would be suitable for ships keeping station and husbanding their strength for the coming battle. The Spartan ships were in attacking formation, *epi mias*, 'prepared for *diekplous* and *periplous*'. He adds: 'Callicratidas was on the right wing'.

L. says: 'Putting the two fleets of Arginusae in squadrons line ahead makes nonsense of the tactics: the natural interpretation of Xenophon's account is that the Athenian fleet was in two lines abreast, the Spartan in one (*epi mias* in i 6.31 means one ship deep)'. This latter view seems to rest on the wrong assumption that the statement that Callicratidas was on the right wing can imply only a formation line abreast. As far as the Athenians are concerned, no reasonable interpretation of Xenophon's words can make the Athenian formation two deep throughout.

Since *epi mias* is always ambiguous (as LSJ confirms), Callicratidas's formation must be inferred from the context on grounds of probability and practicality. The idea of 120 ships keeping station in line abreast one deep while they row over 8 nm of open sea for 1½ hours is one which no one even without the practical experience of navigating *Olympias* can easily entertain. Line ahead is the normal formation of ships in transit and attack. But it is equally absurd to suppose that the Spartan ships moved to the attack in single file strung out over three miles of water. The statement that Callicratidas was on the right wing does however give the clue. Like the Athenians, the Spartans were in squadrons of, probably, fifteen ships each, making eight in all. They were in single file, with Callicratidas in his proper position at the head of the squadron on the right wing. If the Spartan ships came over in columns, and moved into line abreast when they arrived (about which Xenophon says nothing) they could not then be said to be 'prepared for *diekplous*

and *periplous*'. Line abreast, *metôpêdon*, is essentially a static defensive posture maintained by a fleet which is slower than its opponent, while line ahead is the formation of ships conscious of their tactical superiority and on the attack. The central squadrons could try to penetrate the Athenian squadrons arranged in depth (*diekplous*), while the wing squadrons could attempt a double *periplous*.

On L.'s assumptions the Athenians would have had 150 ships in two ranks of 75 ships each, while the Spartans would have had a much longer but extremely weak front of 120 ships one deep which could hardly be described as suitable preparation for either of the tasks envisaged.

Salamis

In his review L. says that he would particularly like to know where Aeschylus says that 'after a clash they (i.e. the Greeks) moved through behind the Persian ships and surrounded them' (*AT* 59).

Aeschylus says (*Persians* 381-93) that the Persian ships spent the night before the battle patrolling, and at daybreak first heard the Greeks singing the paean, then the splash of oars; and then 'quickly they were all plain to see'. This is consistent with the belief that the Greek fleet was beached at Paloukia Bay (where the modern ferry from Piraeus to Salamis arrives), and that being hidden there from the patrolling Persians, the ships would only have become visible when they came out from behind the island of Hagios Georgios.

Then (399-428): 'The right wing first in good order led the array, next the whole fleet came out after it'. 'Straightway ship smote her bronze armament on ship. A Greek ship began the attack' shearing off part of a Phoenician ship, and others joined in. 'First the flow of the Persian squadron held on'. It had been moving up the channel from its patrolling station. 'But as the mass of (Persian) ships was crowded together and they could not help each other, and began ramming each other, they shattered the whole oared squadron. But the Greek ships *'skilfully around them in a circle delivered blows'* (κύκλω περίξ θεινον). The picture of the Greek ships by clever tactics surrounding and crowding a disorderly and self-destroying mass of Persian ships is made still more vivid a few lines later by the image of the tunny fishers. Tunny, as I have seen, are caught in a large net. Then the fishermen kill them with spears and other weapons, *placing their boats side by side in a circle round the net.*

When Aeschylus says that the right wing of the Greeks, beside the friendly Salamis shore, led the formation, and then the rest of the fleet followed, it is reasonable to believe him. He was probably there himself, and at any rate he was writing for people many of whom were. The use of the word 'wing' does not, as has been seen, imply, what the rest of these words deny, that the Greek fleet was, at the moment of attack, in line abreast. What follows is consistent with the picture of the Greek fleet swinging into line ahead after a preliminary formation *metôpêdon*. The attack of the Greek ship on the Phoenician ship would be the first move in the *diekplous* by one of the ships at the head of the column, and this ship was immediately supported

by the rest, the immediate support of other ships close behind being the reason for attack in column. The momentum of the Persian ships continued to take them forward, but the 'breakthrough' must have been successful because the next picture Aeschylus draws is of Persian ships crowded together and destroying each other, while the Greek ships have surrounded them and are ramming them in a disorderly mass. The picture is confirmed and made more vivid by the image of the tunny kill. I cannot see that it can be seriously disputed that Aeschylus says, in brief, that after a clash the Greeks moved behind the Persians and surrounded them.

Herodotus's account of the opening moves of the battle is from the Persian standpoint, which he learnt at Halicarnassus. It can be reconciled that understood, with Aeschylus's testimony, viii 83.2-84.1: 'Then the Greeks took out all their ships, and as they put out the Persians attacked them'. They were after all moving up the channel as the Greeks came out. 'The other Greeks were backing down and trying to run their ships ashore'. 'But Ameinias, an Athenian of Pallene, rammed a ship', a Phoenician, since Herodotus says that the Phoenicians were opposite the Athenians (viii 85.1). 'Since his ship was stuck fast and the crew could not get her free, *the other ships came to the rescue and joined in.* (Cf. Curtius iv 4.7, a description of the initial stage of a *diekplous* by one of Alexander's pentereis, with the support of two triereis, at the siege of Tyre. Like Herodotus, Curtius's source did not quite understand what was going on.)

The moves in Herodotus's picture are the same as those in Aeschylus's, but looked at from the other side. The Persians on the hillside of Attica could see what the patrolling Persians could not, the Greeks putting out and forming lines *metôpêdon* across the channel. The next Greek move that they saw, and misinterpreted, was the turn to the right *epi keras*. It looked to them as if the Greek oarsmen were backing down and trying to run their ships aground prow first, since they would have faced the Salamis shore before wheeling round into line ahead. The third move they saw was the Athenian ship ramming a Phoenician ship in the opposite Persian line and other Greek ships coming from behind in support.

Diekplous is too technical a word for Aeschylus's poetic vocabulary. Nevertheless there seems to be good ground for thinking that this manoeuvre, which Dionysius of Phocaea had taught the Ionians 20 years before, was what Aeschylus described and what Herodotus's Halicarnassian informant saw but did not understand. The *diekplous* closely resembles the *periplous*, and has the same tactical aim, to get into a position to ram an enemy ship from astern, where she is most vulnerable and offers least danger to the ramming ship. The 'breakthrough' is dangerous to the leading ship which needs immediate support, and is likely to involve deck fighting. Commanders have to resort to it when, as at Salamis, there is no sea room for the *periplous*. The latter, like the Persian manoeuvres off Artemisium and Phormio's at the entrance of the Gulf, is a movement using in its initial stage sea room, rather than ship-to-ship

conflict by ramming or use of deck soldiers, to reach the enemy's rear. The final effect, if the move is successful, could be the same, as shown by the striking similarity between Aeschylus's description of the final stages at Salamis and Thucydides's description of the effect of Phormio's *periplous* (*AT* 68-71). The Greek ships in the preliminary skirmish at Artemisium did however show that the *periplous*, adopted by the Persians and resulting in the loss of thirty ships, was a risky tactic against a disciplined and opportunistic opponent.

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Dicaeopolis' motivations in Aristophanes' *Acharnians**

Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, performed at the Lenaea in 425 BC, is the story of Dicaeopolis' unilateral withdrawal from Athens' political system and her seemingly endless war against Sparta.¹ What seems never to have been appreciated is the extent to which the hero's motivations are specifically economic in character.² Dicaeopolis resents both his unhappy new status as an urban cash-consumer of staple goods, and the fact that he is excluded from all the pleasures the war-time city still has to offer, while others continue to enjoy themselves. It is a combination of these resentments which drives the hero to break ranks with his fellow citizens and make his separate peace with the Peloponnesians, and both problems are accordingly resolved in the 'ideal' new world of the second half of the play.

Dicaeopolis is (at least at first) a good citizen (esp. 28-9), although he is disgruntled with Athens and Athenians.³ As he makes clear in his opening

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¹ I refer throughout to the text of V. Coulon, *Aristophane* i (Paris 1923). Although there is no thorough modern scholarly edition of the play, the commentaries of W. Rennie, *The Acharnians of Aristophanes* (London 1909), W. J. M. Starkie, *The Acharnians of Aristophanes* (London 1909), B. B. Rogers, *The Acharnians of Aristophanes* (London 1910), and A. H. Sommerstein, *Acharnians, The Comedies of Aristophanes* i (Warminster 1980), are all valuable.

² With the exception of the historical question of the content and effect of the Megarian Decree (for which see esp. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The origins of the Peloponnesian War* [Ithaca 1972] 225-89), economic issues in *Acharnians* have received little sustained critical attention. V. Ehrenberg, *The people of Aristophanes* (Oxford 1943), is more concerned with Aristophanes as a source for day-to-day life in Athens than with the playwright's larger poetic purposes. I. Stark, 'Das Verhältnis des Aristophanes zur Demokratie der Athenischen Polis', *Klio* lvii (1975) 329-64, unfortunately fails to document her wide-ranging claims about developments in Athenian society, and seems out of touch with much of the modern European and American work on the play.

³ On the significance of the hero's name, see E. L. Bowie,

this disaffection is rooted first of all in his altered economic position since the war began. Forced out of his deme and within the city walls by the hostilities, he has become a cash-consumer of charcoal, vinegar and olive oil, goods his old country home supplied without money and in abundance: ὃς οὐδεπώποτ' εἶπεν "ἀνθρακας πρίω", / οὐκ ὄξος, οὐκ ἔλαιον, οὐδ' ἦδει πρίω, / ἄλλ' αὐτὸς ἔφερε πάντα (34-6).⁴ Secondly, while Dicaeopolis, trapped inside the city walls (see also 71-2), grows steadily poorer, others are growing rich.⁵ The ambassadors to Persia (who complain unconvincingly about their difficult life—68-71), for example, have been given two drachmae a day for years of 'official business', most of which apparently consisted of eating and drinking massive amounts (66; 90; compare 73-5; 77-8; 85-6; 88-9).⁶ Theoros as well was generously compensated for his 'services' (primarily an endless round of parties in Sitalces' court—141), and Dicaeopolis has little doubt that he too dawdled on his way home in order to draw as much pay as possible (136-7). None of these characters, of course, has the slightest interest in seeing the fighting come to an

'Who is Dicaeopolis?', *JHS* cviii (1988) 183-5. Bowie may be right to argue that the name 'Dicaeopolis' would remind an Athenian audience of the contemporary Comic playwright Eupolis. Bowie's theory that the aggressively self-assertive (esp. 633-58) Aristophanes wrote a play with one of his main rivals as a hero seems improbable on the face of it, however, and rests on a series of unprovable and generally unlikely assumptions: that Eupolis was prosecuted by Cleon in 426/5 BC along with Aristophanes (a hypothesis for which there is no evidence whatsoever); that an audience who heard the (as yet unidentified) hero's speech in 377-82 would automatically identify him with another poet, rather than with the author of the play (who, as many presumably knew, had recently had precisely the same sort of troubles cf. 628-31); and that the name 'Dicaeopolis', when finally given (406), would suggest 'Eupolis himself', rather than 'someone like Eupolis, who claims that his special concern is τὰ δίκαια' (see 655, 661), i.e., 'Aristophanes'. As A. H. Sommerstein has pointed out to me, however, this identification too is undercut by the fact that the hero says he is from the deme Cholleidae (406). The historical Aristophanes (*PA* 2090) was from Kydathenaion; the deme-affiliation of Eupolis (*PA* 5936) is unknown. For a separate response to Bowie, see the note by L. P. E. Parker, which appears below.

⁴ This is certainly the point at which the observations of Stark (n. 2) 340-1, about the rise of an economy of 'exchange value' in Aristophanes' Athens, have their greatest relevance.

⁵ The existence of economic corruption in the city's leadership has already been hinted at in Dicaeopolis' opening reference to the five talents which the Knights forced Cleon to 'vomit forth' (5-8). On the events alluded to here, see most recently E. M. Carawan, 'The five talents Cleon coughed up', *CQ* n.s. xl (1990) 137-47. A bankruptcy of political leadership is apparently not unique to Athens. The Megarian declares that when he left his city, the Councillors were doing their best to ruin it as quickly and miserably as possible (754-6).

⁶ Meanwhile, Amphitheos' request for sufficient funds to allow him to go to Sparta to make peace leads to his expulsion from the Assembly (53-4). Two drachmae a day does not, in fact, seem to have been an excessive rate of pay for ambassadors, and (once expenses were paid) probably offered little opportunity to grow rich at public expense. See W. L. Westermann, 'Note upon the ephodia of Greek ambassadors', *CP* v (1910) 203-16; D. J. Mosley, *Envoys and diplomacy in ancient Greece*, *Historia Einzelschrift* xxii (Wiesbaden 1973) 74-7.